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PRIVACY AND THE SEX BFOQ: AN IMMODEST
PROPOSAL
Carolyn S. Bratt*
Since the adoption of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1
courts have been called upon to determine whether an employer can
avoid liability for refusing to hire employees of one sex by invoking
the privacy rights of its customers. Two recent court decisions are
illustrative of the question and its resolution. In Backus v. Baptist
Medical Center,2 the defendant employer's policy of excluding male
nurses from the labor and delivery section of its obstetrics and gyne-
cology department was challenged. The defendant established that
most of the duties of a labor and delivery nurse involve exposure to
the patient's genitalia and that a male nurse would be objectionable
to obstetrical patients. The court upheld the employer's practice of
excluding male nurses on the theory that their presence would consti-
tute a violation of the patient's right of privacy.' Similarly, in Owens
v. Rush5 a female deputy in a county sheriff's office alleged that she
had been discriminated against in violation of Title VII because she
was not notified of the opening for the position of head jailer. Be-
cause the job of jailer involved overseeing male prisoners who lived in
a communal environment without private showers and toilets, the
court accepted the defendant sheriff's defense that being male was a
* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.A. 1965, State University of New York at
Albany; J.D. 1974, Syracuse University. The author expresses her appreciation to the National
Endowment for the Humanities for the opportunity to participate in the 1981 Summer Seminar
for Law Teachers on Economic Rights. It was at this seminar that the idea for this article was
conceived.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982).
a 510 F. Supp. 1191 (E.D. Ark. 1981), vacated as moot, 671 F.2d 1100 (8th Cir. 1982).
I d. at 1193.
4Id.
5 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1543 (D. Kan. 1979), aff'd in relevant part, 636 F.2d 283
(10th Cir. 1980).
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bona fide qualification for the job.'
Any exception to Title VII's mandate of nondiscrimination in em-
ployment undermines the Act's goal of equal employment opportu-
nity.7 A privacy-based exception must therefore be carefully scruti-
nized. This Article begins with a discussion of the bona fide
occupational qualification (BFOQ) exception to Title VII. This sec-
tion is followed by a criticism of the various methodological ap-
proaches employed by courts and suggested by commentators for an-
alyzing employer allegations that hiring an opposite-sex employee
jeopardizes customers' privacy rights. Because the right of privacy is
the core of this employer defense, the nature and extent of the right
of privacy is explored in the next section of the Article. The final
section contains an analysis of the privacy-based sex BFOQ defense
in light of the customer's right of privacy.
I. THE BONA FIDE OCCUPATIONAL QUALIFICATION EXCEPTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19648 embodies a federal guar-
antee of nondiscrimination in employment by prohibiting hiring and
other employment practices that discriminate on the basis of sex.9
Nevertheless, the Act does contain an exception to its general rule of
nondiscrimination. An employer may hire workers on the basis of sex
when sex is a BFOQ reasonably necessary to the normal operation of
6 Id. at 1550-51.
7 Moreover, the struggle for economic equality is of central and enduring importance to the
goal of full equality for women. Whether single or married, women require a share of the eco-
nomic goods sufficient for both sustaining life and promoting self-development. Without such a
share, women are extremely vulnerable to economic coercion, which is at least as oppressive
and debilitating as political coercion. The relative well-being of women determines their ability
to exercise their constitutional and statutory guarantees of civil and political equality. See V.
HELD, PROPERTY, PROFITS, AND ECONOMIC JUSTICE 1-19 (1980).
Since the inception of the organized women's movement during the mid-nineteenth century,
equality in employment has been recognized as a crucial factor in women's struggle to achieve
economic and ultimately full equality. For example, The Declaration of Sentiments, adopted
July 19, 1848 at the First Women's Rights Convention, enumerated women's grievances against
economic, social and political oppression:
He has taken from her all right in property, even to the wages she earns....
He has monopolized nearly all the profitable employments, and from those she is per-
mitted to follow, she receives but scant remuneration. He closes against her all the ave-
nues to wealth and distinction which he considers most honorable to himself. As a
teacher of theology, medicine, or law, she is not known.
B. BABCOCK, A. FREEDMAN, E. NORTON & S. Ross, SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW: CAUSES
AND REMEDIES 1-2 (1975) [hereinafter cited as B. BABCOCK].
8 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982).
9Id.
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that particular employer's business.10
When first introduced, the Title VII legislation did not mention
sex as a protected classification. Rather, sex was added by an amend-
ment which emanated from the floor of the House of Representa-
tives." Therefore, relevant legislative history to aid in interpreting
the BFOQ provision as applied to sex is meager. Any broad construc-
tion of the BFOQ defense would, however, seriously undermine the
goal of eradicating sex discrimination in the workplace. Broad inter-
pretations would permit the continued exclusion of women, qua
women, from many occupations.2 In light of this danger, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the federal agency
charged with promulgating rules for implementing as well as enforc-
ing Title VII, has issued guidelines based on a narrow reading of the
BFOQ provision."
The EEOC guidelines provide that the BFOQ exception is unwar-
ranted when discriminatory hiring decisions are based upon general
"assumptions of the comparative employment characteristics"' 4 of
the excluded sex, or upon "stereotyped characterizations of one of
10 Id. § 2000e-2(e)(1). Title VIrs BFOQ provision states in pertinent part that "it shall not
be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ [an individual]... on
the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or
national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of that particular business or enterprise." Id.
1" 110 CONG. Rsc. 2584 (1964). See also Sirota, Sex Discrimination: Title VII and the Bona
Fide Occupational Qualification, 55 Thx. L. Rav. 1025, 1027-1031 (1977).
32 Two facets of equality in employment for women are pay equity and access to employment
opportunities. For example, the gap between median pay for full-time female and male workers
actually increased during the last 25 years. In 1955 the annual earnings of full-time female
workers was 63.9% of male earnings. By 1981 female earnings had declined to 59.2% of male
earnings. WOMEN'S BuRvAu, OFFc oF TH SRcarrARY, U.S. DEisT OF LABOR, EQUAL EMPLOY-
MENT OPPORTUNrrY FOR WoMEN: U.S. POLICm, Table 12 (1982) [hereinafter cited as WOMEN'S
BuRz&u]. Currently, although the concentration of women in particular occupations has de-
creased somewhat, the American workforce continues to reflect an overwhelmingly gender seg-
regated employment pattern. Female workers are concentrated in the lowest-paying occupa-
tional categories: women represent 81% of all clerical workers, 97% of all private household
workers, and 60% of all other service workers. Id. at Table 18. Not only have these jobs tradi-
tionally received low pay, but they also have provided only limited opportunities for advance-
ment to higher paying jobs. Id. at 15.
Within occupational groups, a segregative pattern of placing female workers in the lowest
paying jobs is also visible. Female workers in professional and technical occupational groups
comprise 96.5% of all registered nurses, 85.2% of all librarians, and 83.7% of all elementary
school teachers; whereas they comprise only 8.6% of all industrial engineers, 12.8% of all law-
yers and judges, and 13.4% of all physicians. Id. at Table 11. The undervaluation of work
traditionally performed by women coupled with this sex-segregated pattern of employment ac-
counts for some of the pay discrepancy between female and male workers. Id. at 15.
'3 See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (1983).
14 Id. § 1604.2(a)(1)(i). An example of such an impermissible assumption is the notion that
the turnover rate among women is higher than among men.
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the sexes." 1' Moreover, the EEOC guidelines state that sex is not a
BFOQ when the refusal to hire applicants based on sex is predicated
on the preferences of third parties, such as co-workers, clients, or
customers.16
Although court decisions interpreting the BFOQ provision shed
some light on the parameters of the defense, the contours of the pro-
vision are not precisely defined. While the United States Supreme
Court has placed its imprimatur on the view that the BFOQ provides
"only the narrowest of exceptions" to Title VII's general mandate of
equality in employment opportunity, 17 the Court has not otherwise
endorsed any particular formulation of the BFOQ defense.
Lower court decisions involving the BFOQ embody varying degrees
of restrictive interpretations. The most restrictive view recognized by
some lower courts is similar to the one espoused in the EEOC guide-
lines.18 It provides that the BFOQ defense is available to the em-
ployer only when the job in question requires either a person with a
sex specific physical characteristic or a person of a particular sex for
authenticity purposes.19 Another narrow interpretation of the BFOQ
is that an employer may rely on the defense only by proving that the
employer has "reasonable cause to believe, that is a factual basis for
believing, that all or substantially all women would be unable to per-
form safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved."20 Under
this formulation, the employer must establish that these duties apply
" Id. § 1604.2(a)(1)(ii). Impermissible stereotypes include the idea that men are less capable
of assembling equipment and women are less capable of aggressive salesmanship.
16 Id. § 1604.2(a)(1)(iii).
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333-34 (1977). In Dothard, a 22 year-old woman
sought employment as a "correctional counselor" and was denied on the basis of an Alabama
statute that required such counselors to weigh at least one hundred and twenty pounds and be
at least five feet, two inches tall. The Supreme Court reversed the district court and held that
being male is a BFOQ "for the job of correctional counselor in a 'contact' position in an Ala-
bama male maximum security penitentiary." Id. at 337 (footnote omitted).
18 See Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971). In Rosenfeld, the em-
ployer rejected the female plaintiff without testing her ability to fill the position of agent-teleg-
rapher. The employer restricted the applicants for the position to men because the job was
"arduous." The job entailed climbing over and around box cars to adjust vents, collapse
bunkers and close and seal doors. Sometimes the agent-telegrapher had to lift objects weighing
over 25 pounds and occasionally over 50 pounds. Id. at 1223.
19 The court in Rosenfeld stated: "[biased on the legislative intent and on the Commission's
interpretation, sexual characteristics, rather than characteristics that might, to one degree or
another, correlate with a particular sex, must be the basis for the application of the BFOQ
exception." Id. at 1225.
" Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969). The Weeks
court found that the employer telephone and telegraph company had not proven that the job of
switchman came within the BFOQ exception to Title VII's general prohibition. Id. at 236.
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to the "essence of the business operation."21 In one case, an airline
company attempted to justify its female-only hiring policy for cabin
attendants through the use of the BFOQ defense.2 2 Although the air-
line company introduced evidence that all, or substantially all, males
could not perform the non-mechanical functions of the job (such as
soothing passengers) as well as females, these non-mechanical aspects
of the cabin attendant job were deemed only tangentiglsto the es-
sence of the business of providing safe air transportation.2 8 Hence,
the court ruled that the presence of male cabin attendants would not
jeopardize the airline's ability to provide safe transportation. 4
Because the BFOQ exception has generally been narrowly inter-
preted, employers claiming the defense rarely have been exonerated
from charges of facially discriminatory practices. For example, the
Ninth Circuit has held that an employer's compliance with single-sex,
state protective legislation does not establish a BFOQ defense for its
refusal to hire women.2 5 Similarly, an employer cannot claim that the
"strenuous, dangerous, obnoxious, boring or unromantic tasks" asso-
ciated with a particular job establish a male BFOQ.2 Customer pref-
erence for one sex over the other, 7 the additional expenses incurred
in hiring employees of both sexes,2" and a male BFOQ predicated on
an employer fetal vulnerability program have also been rejected as
justifications for a BFOQ.'9





" See Homemakers, Inc. v. Division of Indus. Welfare, 509 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1971). See also
29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(b) (1983).
" Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 288, 236 (5th Cir. 1969).
17 Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
950 (1971). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(iii) (1983).
" Prior to 1973, EEOC Guidelines provided that an employer qualified for a sex BFOQ if the
"expense [of providing separate facilities for employees of each sex] would be clearly unreason-
able." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(a)(iv) (1966). However, the EEOC repealed the "clearly unreasonable"
regulation and substituted a new provision providing:
Some States require that separate restrooms be provided for employees of each sex. An
employer will be deemed to have engaged in an unlawful employment practice if it ref-
uses to hire or otherwise adversely affects the employment opportunities of applicants or
employees in order to avoid the provision of such restrooms for persons of that sex.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(b)(5) (1983). This regulation treats the failure to expend money for
restrooms as an unlawful employment practice. See Sirota, supra note 11, at 1052-56 (citing
cases).
"Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 546 F. Supp. 259 (N.D. Ala. 1982); EEOC v. Olin Corp.,
24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1646 (W.D.N.C. 1980). The Olin court described its fetal vul-
nerability policy as one "under which women of childbearing capability have not been allowed
19841
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In spite of the typically narrow interpretation accorded the BFOQ
provision of Title VII, instances of successful use of the defense do
exist. For example, the Supreme Court sustained Alabama's policy of
assigning only male prison guards to "contact" positions in its maxi-
mum security prisons for men.30 Although the Court specifically lim-
ited its holding to the facts of the case, it nonetheless held that the
presence of female prison guards would undermine prison security.31
In particular, the Court noted that inmates' reactions to a female
guard's "very womanhood" might be adverse. 2
The BFOQ defense may also be used successfully in those in-
stances where sex "is necessary for the purpose of authenticity or
genuineness,' '3 or when the job requires a person with a sex-specific
physical characteristic. Under this'defense, employers may hire only
females as actresses or only males as sperm donors. The authenticity
BFOQ also has permitted Playboy Clubs to hire only females as
"bunnies,"3 ' and has justified a state's preference for hiring only fe-
males to perform police undercover assignments directed at illegal
abortionists and purse snatchers.3 5
In spite of these examples of successfully invoked BFOQ defenses,
court opinions display a remarkable degree of uniformity regarding
the narrow nature of the BFOQ exception; and most courts carefully
scrutinize employer BFOQ defense claims. This judicial approach is
especially warranted given Title VII's goal of achieving equal employ-
ment opportunities. Indeed, any broadly viewed exception to Title
VII's nondiscrimination mandates would tend to perpetuate sex-seg-
regative employment patterns and the wage depression associated
with such employment patterns.
The usually close judicial examination of employer's BFOQ claims,
however, is noticeably absent in one category of court decisions.
These cases involve sex BFOQ defenses predicated upon alleged inva-
to occupy certain job classifications. . . because of possible harmful effects of certain chemicals
upon the unborn fetus." Id. at 1658. Because such BFOQ's have only recently been asserted
there are very few reported decisions. However, for a thorough discussion on Title VII and fetal
health, see Williams, Firing the Women to Protect the Fetus: The Reconciliation of Fetal Pro-
tection with Employment Opportunity Goals under Title VII, 69 GEo. L.J. 641 (1981).
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
Id. at 336.
I d.
" See Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1224 (9th Cir. 1971).
IN Margarita St. Cross v. Playboy Club of N.Y., Appeal No. 773, Case No. CSF 22618-70
(N.Y. Human Rts. Comm'n), cited and discussed in Guardian Capital Corp. v. New York State
Div. of Human Rights, 46 A.D.2d 832, 833, 360 N.Y.S.2d 937, 939-40 (1974), appeal dismissed,
36 N.Y.2d 806, 369 N.Y.S.2d 1027 (1975).
36 Button v. Rockefeller, 76 Misc. 2d 701, 351 N.Y.S.2d 488 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
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sions of third parties' privacy rights." Employers claim that an inva-
The BFOQ defense and privacy rights have been discussed in a variety of contexts. Courts
have often insisted upon summarily granting the BFOQ or finding that accommodation of pri-
vacy and equal employment opportunities is possible, thereby avoiding any analysis of privacy
as a basis for the BFOQ provision. For cases relating to the employment of correctional person-
nel and discussing privacy rights, see Madyun v. Franzen, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 817
(7th Cir. 1983) (finding that state policy of allowing female guards to frisk-search male inmates,
but disallowing male guards to frisk-search female inmates does not violate equal protection
clause); Harden v. Dayton Human Rehabilitation Center, 520 F. Supp. 769 (S.D. Ohio 1981)
(finding that competing interests of privacy and equal employment opportunities could be ac-
commodated, thereby denying BFOQ in regard to position of rehabilitation specialist); Gunther
v. Men's Reformatory, 462 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. Iowa 1979) (male BFOQ for guards of male
inmates denied; accommodation possible), affd, 612 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir. 1980); Owens v. Rush,
24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1543 (D. Kan. 1979) (upholding male BFOQ for head jailer),
aff'd in relevant part, 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1563 (10th Cir. 1980); Mieth v. Dothard,
418 F. Supp. 1169 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (male BFOQ for guards of male inmates permitted but
decided on other grounds), rev'd sub nom. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Reynolds
v. Wise, 375 F. Supp. 145 (N.D. Tex. 1974) (invalidating policy of assigning male guards to male
inmates and female guards to female inmates and finding accommodation possible); EEOC Dec.
No. 82-4, 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1845 (1982) (denying male BFOQ for group leader in
male unit of temporary detention center for delinquent youth); Iowa Dep't. Social Servs. v.
Iowa Merit Employment Dep't., 261 N.W.2d 161 (Iowa 1977) (upholding male BFOQ for guards
of male inmates); Terry v. Mercer County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 173 N.J. Super. 249, 414
A.2d 30 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980) (upholding male BFOQ for boys' supervisor and female
BFOQ for girls' supervisor); Carey v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 61 A.D.2d
804, 402 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1978) (upholding female BFOQ for guards of female inmates); City of
Philadelphia v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n, 7 Pa. Commw. 500, 300 A.2d 97
(1973) (upholding male BFOQ for supervisors of male detainees and female BFOQ for supervi-
sors of female detainees in youth center).
In cases relating to inmate complaints, the privacy issue arises out of allegations that employ-
ment of opposite-sex guards violates the inmates' constitutional right of privacy. Although the
institution may raise the equal employment mandates of Title VII as a defense, Title VII is not
directly implicated. The analysis developed in this Article for resolving the privacy issue in the
context of Title VII litigation, however, is applicable to inmate-initiated lawsuits. See Forts v.
Ward, 621 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1980) (upholding male guards of female inmates where accommo-
dation is possible); Avery v. Perrin, 473 F. Supp. 90 (D.N.H. 1979) (permitting female to deliver
mail to male prisoner since the privacy invasion is small); Doe v. Duter, 407 F. Supp. 922 (W.D.
Wis. 1976) (denying female students in delinquent girls' school injunction to prohibit participa-
tion of male staff members in bodily search of female students who refused to cooperate in the
conduct of the search); Hand v. Briggs, 360 F. Supp. 484 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (dismissing suit by
male inmate because complaint merely alleged female guards were in a position to invade in-
mates' privacy-not that females had actually done so); In re Long, 55 Cal. App. 3d 788, 127
Cal. Rptr. 732 (1976) (granting petition of male wards alleging the female staff personnel in-
vaded wards' privacy by observing wards in bedrooms and bathrooms); Sterling v. Cupp, 44 Or.
App. 755, 607 P.2d 206 (1980) (granting injunction to prevent female guards from performing
body searches of clothed prisoners).
Cases noting privacy concerns relating to employment of health care personnel include EEOC
v. Mercy Health Center, 29 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 159 (W.D. Okla. 1982) (upholding
female BFOQ for staff nurse in labor and delivery); Backus v. Baptist Medical Center, 510 F.
Supp. 1191 (E.D. Ark 1981) (upholding female BFOQ for labor and delivery room nurse), va-
cated as moot, 671 F.2d 1100 (8th Cir. 1982); Fesel v. Masonic Home of Del., Inc., 447 F. Supp.
1346 (D. Del. 1978) (upholding female BFOQ for nurse in nursing home), afl'd mem., 591 F.2d
1334 (3d Cir. 1979); Kaiser Found. Hosp. & Medical Centers, 67-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH)
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sion of their customers' privacy rights would occur if the employer is
forced to hire members of the excluded sex. To date, the remarkable
feature of these decisions recognizing a privacy-based sex BFOQ is
that the mere incantation of the words "right to privacy" seemingly
justifies recognition of the sex BFOQ defense. 7
II. A CRITIQUE OF CURRENT TREATMENT OF THE PRIVACY-BASED
BFOQ8e
Some jurists and commentators dismiss employer-customer privacy
18471 (1967) (upholding female BFOQ for nurses who perform "sensitive personal care" for
female patients). For cases relating to miscellaneous employment situations, see Roberts v.
Union Co., 487 F.2d 387 (6th Cir. 1973) (permitting male BFOQ for clerks in men's clothing
department but decided on other grounds); Brooks v. ACF Indus., 537 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D.
W.Va. 1982) (upholding male BFOQ for janitor of male bathhouse); Sutton v. National Distill-
ers Prods., 445 F. Supp. 1319 (S.D. Ohio 1978) (finding no Title VII violation when female
security guard not permitted to search male employees); Long v. State Personnel Bd., 41 Cal.
App. 3d 1000, 116 Cal. Rptr. 562 (1974) (upholding male BFOQ for chaplain in male youth
training center); Corn Prods. Co. Int'l. Inc., 70-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 18432 (1970) (Gross,
Arb.) (upholding male BFOQ for janitor in men's locker room); E.E.O.C. Dec. No. 70-286, 1973
EEOC Dec. (CCH) 6077 (1969).
7 For example, in City of Philadelphia v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n, 7 Pa.
Commw. 500, 300 A.2d 97 (1973), the court upheld a same-sex BFOQ for supervisors in youth
centers stating, "[i]f sex is not 'relevant' in the supervision of children who range in age from
seven to sixteen in various stages of undress, where can it be?" Id. at 505, 300 A.2d at 102. In
Iowa Dep't of Social Servs. v. Iowa Merit Employment Dep't, 261 N.W.2d 161 (Iowa 1977), the
court upheld a male BFOQ for guards of male prisoners stating, "[i]t is apparent, and is undis-
puted, there would be a constitutional violation of inmates' rights if the guards were women."
Id. at 165.
" The recent cases invoking a privacy-based BFOQ defense are hauntingly reminiscent of
the so-called Lockner era. At the turn of the twentieth century, a series of Supreme Court
decisions overturned legislated protections for workers, thus perpetuating an employer-worker
status quo detrimental to all workers. Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587
(1936) (invalidated minimum wage for women); Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923)
(invalidated minimum wage for women); Lockner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidated
maximum hours for bakers). See also State v. Barba, 132 La. 768, 61 So. 784 (1913) (invali-
dated eight-hour law for stationary firemen); Commonwealth v. Boston & Main R.R., 22 Mass.
206, 110 N.E. 264 (1915) (invalidated 9-hours-work-in-10-hours-time law for railroad workers);
State v. Miksicek, 225 Mo. 561, 125 S.W. 507 (1910) (invalidated six-day-work-week act). But
see Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917) (upheld maximum hours for manufacturing estab-
lishments); State v. Lumber Co., 102 Miss. 802, 59 So. 923 (1912) (upheld maximum hours for
manufacturing establishments); People v. Klinck Packing Co., 214 N.Y. 121, 108 N.E. 278
(1915) (upheld one day of rest in seven for all workers). Similarly, today's court decisions in-
yoking a privacy-based BFOQ validate occupational segregation, thereby perpetuating an em-
ployer-worker status quo detrimental to present-day workers.
It is ironic that today's employers, like employers at the turn of the century, avoid prosecu-
tion for violations of remedial employment legislation by invoking the rights of others. In the
Lockner era, employers raised the right of their employees to contract without interference
from the state. Today, employers claim that their customers' privacy rights validate the em-
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arguments as nothing but cynical and feeble rationalizations for
maintaining the discriminatory status quo.a1 Other commentators
dismiss the privacy-based sex BFOQ defense as merely a species of
the previously rejected pure customer preference defense.40 Alterna-
tively, others draw a distinction between private and public employ-
ment.4 With respect to public employment, the constitutional
dimensions of the right of privacy are present,42 and thus the cus-
tomer's rights have been deemed to outweigh the employee's rights
under Title VII.43 In the private employment situation, however, the
question has sometimes been resolved in favor of the employee's em-
ployment rights because constitutional guarantees and protection are
not applicable to private sector employment.44 Finally, in many cases
courts have required public and private employers to accommodate
both the customers' privacy rights and the employees' equal employ-
ployers' refusal to hire because of sex. In both the historical and contemporary settings, the
parties whose rights are supposedly at risk because of legislative mandates are not the com-
plainants. See K. DAVIDSON, R. GINSBURG & H. KAY, CASE AND MATERIALS ON SEX-BASED Dis-
CRIMINATION 15 (1974) (noting that almost all constitutional challenges to maximum hour legis-
lation for women were initiated by the employer alone).
Today, with the exception of inmate-initiated challenges to employment of opposite-sex cor-
rectional personnel, see supra note 36, it is unclear whether customers object to the presence of
opposite-sex employees. Compare Fesel v. Masonic Home of Del., Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1346 (D.
Del. 1978) (nine nursing home patients objected to hiring of male nurses), aff'd mem., 591 F.2d
1334 (3d Cir. 1979), with In re Long, 55 Cal. App. 3d 788, 127 Cal. Rptr. 732 (1976) (letter from
41 wards expressing satisfaction with presence of female staff). The evidentiary problem is sim-
ilar to that which occurs when employers raise customer preference as the justification for a sex
BFOQ. The employer relies on "the vague attitudes of a vaguer assortment of strangers." A.
LARSON & L. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCIMINATION § 15.40, at 4-32 (1983).
n In Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion in the Alabama prison guard case, he voiced his
own incredulity and suspicions concerning the use of the privacy-based BEOQ:
It is strange indeed to hear state officials who have for years been violating the most
basic principles of human decency in the operation of their prisons suddenly become
concerned about inmate privacy. It is stranger still that these same officials allow women
guards in contact positions in a number of nonmaximum-security institutions, but strive
to protect inmates' privacy in the prisons where personal freedom is the most severely
restricted.
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 346 n.5 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
40 C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW OF EMPLOYMENT Dis-
cEIMINATION 148 n.65 (1980). Pure customer preferences are preferences of co-workers, employ.
ers, clients or customers not arising within the context of bodily privacy. 29 C.F.R. §
1604.2(a)(1)(iii) (1983). For example, in Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th
Cir. 1979), the airlines claimed a female BFOQ predicated in part on its claim that airline
passengers preferred female flight attendants.
41 Sirota, supra note 11, at 1062 n.226.
" See infra notes 59-83 and accompanying text.
48 E.g., Iowa Dep't of Social Servs. v. Iowa Merit Employment Dep't, 261 N.W.2d 161 (Iowa
1977).
44 E.g., E.E.O.C. Dec. No. 70-286, 1973 EEOC Dec. (CCH) 6077 (1969) (denying male BFOQ
for lifeguard whose duties included cleaning locker rooms).
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ment rights. 5 Under this judicial approach, a sex BFOQ is only
granted if the defendant employer can show that accommodation im-
poses an unreasonable burden on the employer.4
All of these methods of addressing the privacy-based sex BFOQ
argument have been both employed in court decisions and suggested
by commentators. Consequently, the adequacy of each as a concep-
tual framework for analyzing the privacy-based BFOQ must be
evaluated.
To assert a right is to make a strong moral or legal claim. 47 Unex-
amined acceptance as well as facile dismissals of the privacy-based
BFOQ defense fail to address the question of whether a right is really
at stake. A summary affirmance of the defense may insulate the em-
ployer's actual violation of Title VII even though the customer's right
of privacy is not infringed. Similarly, a summary denial of the de-
fense may overlook, and thus leave unprotected, a legitimate facet of
the right of privacy. Therefore, both of these cursory approaches are
unsatisfactory.
The approach that allows the privacy-based BFOQ defense in the
context of public, but not private, sector employment impermissibly
constricts the right of privacy. Rights encompass far more than mere
limitations on what government may do to an individual. A right in-
volves an entitlement to do or have something, or not to do or have
something done.4 8 Moreover, a right affords protection from interfer-
ence with the enjoyment of the right, and the prophylactic function
of a right is not necessarily conditioned upon the identification of the
government as the intruder. For example, tort law affords protection
from individuals whose actions represent unauthorized intrusion on
the right of privacy. 9
In fact, constitutionally imposed limits on the government's power
to invade a person's bodily integrity may be less extensive than the
limitations imposed on private citizens whose actions intrude upon
another person's bodily integrity. The fourth amendment prohibits
the government from only unreasonable searches and seizures of the
See cases cited supra note 36.
E.g., Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 462 F. Supp. 952, 957-58 (N.D. Iowa
1979); Reynolds v. Wise, 375 F. Supp. 145, 151 (N.D. Tex. 1974). See also Comment, Sex Dis-
crimination in Prison Employment: The Bona Fide Occupational Qualification and Prisoners'
Privacy Rights, 65 IOWA L. REV. 428, 445 (1980); Note, Balancing Inmates' Right to Privacy
with Equal Employment for Prison Guards, 4 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 243, 250-51 (1978).
47 Wasserstrom, Rights, Human Rights and Racial Discrimination, in RIGHTS 46, 48 (D. Ly-
ons ed. 1979).
41 V. HELD, supra note 7, at 7.
4 See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTs 807-09 (1971).
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body;50 but in civil law, any unconsented-to and offensive touching of
another person is a battery entitling the plaintiff to an award of at
least nominal damages.51 Therefore, although a police officer may
touch a person in the context of a constitutionally permissible search,
he or she could not perform the same act without liability in the sta-
tus of a private citizen. Although a person may voluntarily waive the
right that precludes a private citizen from invading his or her bodily
integrity,5' without such a waiver, the private citizen must respect
that right of bodily integrity. In those instances when government
may constitutionally invade a person's bodily integrity, however, it
may do so even over the objections of that person.
The employer accommodation approach is also an inadequate, if
not impermissible, method for resolving the privacy-based sex BFOQ
issue. Title VII expressly mandates reasonable employer accommoda-
tion only in the context of discrimination based on religion.58 Prior to
the enactment of that express provision, the Supreme Court had af-
firmed a lower court ruling which held that the EEOC's authority to
place upon an employer a duty to accommodate an employee's rea-
sonable religious practices lacked a statutory basis." In view of that
holding, the courts arguably may lack the authority to require an em-
ployer to show that accommodation places an undue hardship on
that employer as a condition precedent to granting a privacy-based
BFOQ.
Assuming that the courts do have the authority to impose such a
requirement, as a condition precedent to granting a sex BFOQ, the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the religious accommodation pro-
vision of Title VII necessarily implies that the requirement is a
toothless one. In another Title VII religious discrimination case, the
Court held that neither an employer nor a union has any obligation
to take steps inconsistent with an otherwise valid collective bargain-
ing agreement in attempting to accommodate an employee's religious
practices.' Moreover, according to the Court, an employer is under
"U.S. CONsT. amend. IV. -
61 W. PosssR, supra note 49, at 35.
52 A person may consent to an intentional invasion of his bodily interest, thus preventing the
existence of a tort. Id. at 101.
The only mention of accommodation comes in Title VII's definition of "religion": "'reli-
gion' includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an em-
ployer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospec-
tive employee's religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the
employer's business." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1982) (emphasis added).
Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 402 U.S. 689 (1971), afg 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970).
"Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 79, 81, 84 (1977).
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no obligation to impose undesirable shifts on other employees or to
agree to substitute or replace workers if such accommodation re-
quires "more than de minimis cost."1
The accommodation approach also fails to address the threshold
question of whether the customer's privacy rights actually are jeop-
ardized by the employer's compliance with Title VII's sex nondis-
crimination provisions. The subsidiary issue of whether accommoda-
tion is possible should only be raised after a determination that the
customer's privacy rights are actually jeopardized by the hiring of an
opposite-sex employee. To date, court decisions have assumed an af-
firmative answer to the threshold question without offering a suffi-
cient explanation. 7 Finally, the accommodation solution clearly per-
petuates some types of occupational segregation. To the extent that
these segregative employment patterns are permitted to continue
under this "solution," economic equality without regard to gender is
impeded. The shortcomings of the various approaches illustrate that
the issue of whether a privacy-based BFOQ is necessary must be ad-
dressed by carefully exploring and analyzing the right of privacy
itself.58
"Id. at 84.
' See, e.g., Harden v. Dayton Human Rehabilitation Center, 520 F. Supp. 769 (S.D. Ohio
1981); Gunther v. Men's Reformatory, 462 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. Iowa 1979), aft'd, 612 F.2d 1079
(8th Cir. 1980); Reynolds v. Wise, 375 F. Supp. 145 (N.D. Tex. 1974).
" The BFOQ verbal formulations that "discrimination based on sex is valid only when the
essence of the business operation would be undermined by not hiring members of one sex ex-
clusively," Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 950 (1971), and that the employer has "reasonable cause to believe, that is, a factual basis
for believing, that all or substantially all women would be unable to perform safely and effi-
ciently the duties of the job involved," Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228,
235 (5th Cir. 1969), do not help to resolve the privacy-based BFOQ issue. Typically, the em-
ployer does not claim that members of the excluded sex cannot perform the required tasks.
Rather, the employer claims that the presence of an opposite-sex employee impinges upon the
customer's privacy rights.
The BFOQ defense could be limited to only those situations in which members of one sex
cannot perform the work, but, if so limited, there is almost no need for a BFOQ defense. Title
VII does not require employers to hire applicants who cannot perform the job. Therefore, under
this narrow interpretation, the BFOQ would act only to excuse employers from individually
testing applicants of the excluded sex if there is a factual basis for believing that all, or sub-
stantially all, members of that sex cannot perform the tasks essential to the business operation.
The Supreme Court has not embraced any particular formulation of the BFOQ defense.
Therefore, the door is still open for claims of sex BFOQ predicated on considerations other
than the ability to perform the job. But see Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 30 Empl. Prac.
Dec. (CCH) T33,058 (N.D. Ala. 1982) (where employer claimed a non-pregnancy BFOQ based
on the potential of fetal harm, holding that pregnancy does not adversely affect an expectant
woman's job performance).
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III. THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
The concept of a right of privacy is surrounded by a maelstrom of
differing opinions as to its source, its nature, and its extent.5 Legal 0
and philosophical"1 literature attempting to define "privacy" or the
"right of privacy" is voluminous. Despite this definitional uncertainty
among scholars, the validity of the privacy-based BFOQ must be ex-
amined in light of the nature and extent of the right asserted.
One methodological approach for exploring the concept of privacy
is to identify and categorize those instances where legal recognition
has been extended to a right of privacy. Although the United States
Constitution does not contain an explicit right of privacy, the Su-
preme Court has recognized that the right of privacy emanates from
specific constitutional limitations on governmental power."2 For ex-
ample, Supreme Court cases interpreting the fourth amendment's
guarantee of the right to be free from unreasonable searches and
9 As one writer describes the problem, "[tihe most striking thing about the right of privacy
is that nobody seems to have a very clear idea what it is." Thompson, The Right of Privacy, 4
PHIL. AND PUB. AFF. 295 (1975).
" Legal commentary dealing with the right of privacy includes Benn, Privacy, Freedom, and
a Respect for Persons, in PRIVACY, NOMAS XIII 1 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1971); Bea-
ney, The Right of Privacy and American Law, 31 LAW & CowEmp. Paoas. 253 (1966); Blous-
tein, The First Amendment and Privacy: The Supreme Court Justice and the Philosopher, 28
RUTGERS L. REV. 41 (1974); Bloustein, Privacy, Tort Law, and the Constitution: Is Warren and
Brandeis' Tort Petty and Unconstitutional As Well?, 46 TEx. L. REv. 611 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as Bloustein, Warren and Brandeis' Tort]; Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human
Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 962 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Blous-
tein, An Answer to Dean Prosser]; Craven, Personhood: The Right To Be Let Alone, 1976
DUKE L.J. 699; Davis, What Do We Mean By "Right of Privacy?," 4 S.D.L. REV. 1 (1959);
Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475 (1968); Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
233 (1977); Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410 (1974); Huff, Thinking
Clearly About Privacy, 55 WASH. L. REV. 777 (1979-80); Jourad, Some Psychological Aspects of
Privacy, 31 LAW & CONTM.,'. PROBS. 307 (1966); Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren
and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326 (1966); Konvitz, Privacy and the Law: A
Philosophical Prelude, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 272 (1966); Lusky, Invasion of Privacy: A
Clarification of Concepts, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 693 (1972); Negley, Philosophical Views on the
Value of Privacy, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 319 (1966); Parker, A Definition of Privacy, 27
RUTGERS L. REV. 275 (1974); Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960); Shils, Privacy: Its
Constitution and Vicissitudes, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 281 (1966); Singer, Privacy, Auton-
omy and Dignity in Prison: A Preliminary Inquiry Concerning Constitutional Aspects of the
Degradation Process in Our Prisons, 21 BUFFALO L. REV. 669 (1971); Comment, A Taxonomy of
Privacy: Repose, Sanctuary, and Intimate Decision, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 1447 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Comment, A Taxonomy].
61 For a discussion of the philosophical aspects of the right of privacy, see generally A. WES-
TIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1968); PRIVACY, NOMAS XIII (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1971);
Rachels, Why Privacy Is Important, 4 PHIL. AND PUB. AFF. 323 (1975); Reiman, Privacy, Inti-
macy and Personhood, 6 PHIL. AND PUB. AFF. 26 (1976).
02 Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712-13 (1976).
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seizures highlight one facet of constitutional privacy."3 This under-
standing of privacy comports most closely with the pedestrian view of
privacy as freedom from intrusions into one's personal affairs.6"
Another component of constitutional privacy embraces the right of
the individual to be "free in action, thought, experience, and belief
from governmental compulsion." e The roots of this concept of pri-
vacy are found in the first amendment's protection of associational
rights" and guarantees of freedom of speech, 7 press, and religion;"8
in the ninth amendment's reservation of rights to the people;" in the
fourteenth amendment's guarantees of liberty and equal protection;70
and in the penumbras surrounding the entire Bill of Rights.7 1 In ad-
dition, to the extent that application of the fifth amendment's privi-
lege against self-incrimination "reflects our respect for the inviolabil-
ity of the human personality and of the right of each individual to a
private enclave where he may live a private life, ' 72 it, too, protects
this aspect of constitutional privacy.
" See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 471 (1928) (Brandeis, J. dissenting); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). The third
amendment's guarantee that "[n]o soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house,
without the consent of Owner," U.S. CONST. amend. III, also represents a limitation of govern-
mental power from which a right of privacy might be derived.
" Justice Brandeis captured this aspect of privacy when he wrote that the makers of the
Constitution "conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone -the most com-
prehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men." Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J. dissenting).
" Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 n.24 (1977) (quoting Kurland, The Private I, U. CHI.
MAG., Autumn 1976, at 7, 8).
" U.S. CONST. amend. I. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (compelled dis-
closure of membership lists is restraint on members' freedom of association).
07 U.S. CONST. amend. I. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (protecting under
the first amendment the possession of obscene material in home "[flor also fundamental is the
right to be free ... from unwanted governmental intrusions into one's privacy"); West Virginia
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (compulsory flag salute in public school violates first
amendment).
" U.S. CoNST. amend. I. See, e.g., Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (conscientious
objector with no belief in a "Supreme Being" protected under first amendment); United States
v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (conscientious objector with beliefs parallel to "orthodox belief in
God" protected under first amendment).
09 U.S. CONST. amend. IX. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (Goldberg,
J. concurring).
To U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right of privacy
encompasses woman's decision to have an abortion); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)
(sterilization of criminals offends fundamental nature of the rights to marry and to procreate);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (no power to standardize children through
compulsory public school education); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (no power to
foster homogeneous people).
71 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965).
1* Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966).
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An individual's interest in avoiding governmental disclosure of per-
sonal matters is another facet of the right of privacy recognized in
constitutional law .7 Unlike the more dynamic aspects of privacy in-
volving thought, experience, action, belief and choice, this constitu-
tional component of privacy is largely undefined and unevenly
protected.7'
While the Constitution does permit certain types of governmental
inspection-of-the-body procedures, such as body searches75 and
fingerprinting,7 6 as well as literal invasions of the body in the form of
vaccinations," blood tests,78 and body cavity searches, 9 these inva-
sions impinge upon privacy in varying degrees of severity. Because
"no more basic aspect of personal privacy can be found than bodily
integrity . . .,"80 the fourth amendment imposes significant limita-
tions on when and how governmental invasions of the body may be
undertaken."1 Moreover, the eighth amendment's prohibition of cruel
and unusual punishment implicitly presumes respect for bodily
integrity.8 2
Supreme Court decisions recognizing a right of privacy demon-
strate that a cluster of rights are sheltered under the umbrella of con-
" Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977). In Whalen the appellees contended unsuccess-
fully that the existence of readily available information regarding their use of certain drugs
invaded their "zone of privacy." Id. at 598, 600.
" Compare Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (denying a federal cause of action for police
circulation of photographs of people arrested for shoplifting) with Wisconsin v. Constantineau,
400 U.S. 433 (1971) (granting a cause of action challenging a state statute providing for "post-
ing" names of heavy drinkers).
" United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (full search of person incident to any law-
ful arrest); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (stop and frisk).
70 United States v. Whitfield, 378 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (fingerprinting in conjunction
with lawful arrest). Other procedures justified by a lawful arrest are voice and handwriting
exemplars, fingernail scrapings, and hair or urine samples. See 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
Smzuna 323 (1978) (citing cases).
" Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (compulsory smallpox vaccination).
78 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (blood sample for alcohol content allowed).
See also South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983) (defendant's refusal to submit to blood
test is admissible). Cf. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (forcible pumping of suspect's
stomach violates fourteenth amendment).
Cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (visual inspection of pre-trial detainees' body cavi-
ties is permissible).
0 Cantor, A Patient's Decision To Decline Life-Saving Medical Treatment: Bodily Integrity
Versus The Preservation of Life, 26 RUTGERS L. REv. 228, 241 (1973). Accord Benn, supra note
60, at 12 ("[v]ery intimate connection between the concepts of oneself and one's body ... must
take the body as its first and most basic reference for control over personal identity."); Parker,
supra note 60, at 283-84 ("privacy is control over when and by whom the [physical) part of us
... can be seen or heard ... touched, smelled, or tasted by others").
91 See generally 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 76, at 215-371.
02 L. TamE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 893-96 (1978).
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stitutional privacy."0 These decisions also demonstrate that only cer-
tain privacy claims made against the government receive
constitutional recognition and protection. 4 Constitutional law is not,
however, the only source of the right of privacy.
Nonconstitutional sourcess" as well as statutory lawas define and
protect aspects of the right of privacy. Uncontested-to intrusions
upon an individual's physical solitude or seclusion is a recognized
tort. 7 Tort law also offers protection to the individual's interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters via the torts of public disclos-
ure of private facts 8 and false light in the public eye.89 Bodily integ-
rity also finds protection in criminal sanctions against assaults upon
the bodye as well as in civil tort actions for intentional interference
"' Repose, sanctuary, and intimate decisions have been identified by one taxonomist as the
components of privacy. Repose is defined in accordance with the classic sense of privacy. It is
the right of the individual to block out certain stimuli. Sanctuary is the right of a person to
keep things within the zone of sanctuary. The freedom to make certain fundamental decisions
without the state's injection of factors which disrupt that process is defined as the privacy of
intimate decisions. Comment, A Taxonomy, supra note 60, at 1451, 1456, 1466.
' For example, in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), the Supreme Court denied a federal
cause of action for police circulation of photographs of people arrested for shoplifting.
865 A law review article initiated the development of an independent tort based on an invasion
of the right of privacy. Warren & Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HAsv. L. Rv. 193 (1900).
This tort has been the subject of much debate. Dean Prosser argued that the tort law of privacy
was composed of distinct kinds of invasions of distinct interests of the plaintiff in emotional
tranquility (intrusion upon seclusion), reputation (public disclosure of private facts and false
light in the public eye), and intangible property (appropriation of name or likeness). He be-
lieved that the only things which tied these four torts together were the common name and the
interference with the right "to be let alone." See W. PROSSER, supra note 49, at 807-09. While
others have rejected this idea that tort privacy is a composite of separate interests that have no
independent value, the common thread seems to be a protection of individuality or freedom.
See Bloustein, An Answer to Dean Prosser, supra note 60, at 1002.
Others have criticized the tort law of privacy as a "less precise way of approaching more
specific values, as, for example, in the case of freedom of speech, association, and religion," and
as a petty tort. Kalven, supra note 60, at 327. However, this criticism is answered by the argu-
ment that intrusion on our privacy, especially by mass publicity, is an offense to the right to be
self-determining. "[T]o the degree the tort remedy can preserve ...life option[s] in an age
pervaded and dominated by the mass media of communication, it should be fostered and devel-
oped. Bloustein, Warren and Brandeis' Tort, supra note 60, at 620.
86 E.g., 5 U.S.C. § 555a (1982) (codifying a constitutional right of privacy).
87 The impermissible intrusion can be into the plaintiff's home, hotel room or even the plain-
tiff's shopping bag. The intrusion can be by mechanical means such as wiretaps and micro-
phones as well as by actual physical entry. W. PROSSER, supra note 49, at 807-08.
The impermissible public disclosure can be publicizing the plaintiff's debts or medical pic-
tures of the plaintiff's anatomy. Id. at 809-12.
99 This invasion of the plaintiff's privacy can consist of the unauthorized use of plaintiff's
name on a petition or as a candidate for public office. It also includes the use of the plaintiff's
name on books or articles which the plaintiff did not author. Id. 812-14.
90 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1 (1980). Under the Model Code a person is guilty of
assault if he "(a) attempts to cause or purposely, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to
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with the person.91 These non-constitutional sources evidence a
"majoritarian sentiment regarding the legitimacy and importance of
particular facets of the rights of. . . privacy. '92
Although this taxonomy of constitutional, non-constitutional and
statutory law reveals a multifaceted right of privacy, it does not pro-
vide an analytical tool for evaluating the privacy-based sex BFOQ.
Indeed, what is needed is a principle which ties together the various
components of the right of privacy. Because popular meanings of pri-
vacy vary enormously both cross-culturally and trans-historically,
they must be viewed skeptically as the source of such a principle. In
fact, privacy frequently is confused with the notions of modesty and
embarrassment.9 3 Such notions are by and large culturally condi-
tioned and may have little relationship to privacy. For example, cer-
tain places (bathrooms) and certain activities performed in those
places (defecation) often become symbolic of the entire range of the
privacy concept. 4 Clearly, neither bathrooms nor defecation are in-
trinsically any more private than are dining rooms and eating. Never-
theless, people who internalize these culturally conditioned associa-
tions are embarrassed if the bathroom is invaded and the act of
defecation is observed. In contrast, an invasion of the dining room
and the observation of the act of eating is not likely to elicit such
intense feelings.
In order to transcend cultural influences,95 a unifying principle ty-
ing together the various components of the right of privacy must
come from the universal, or core, values served and vindicated by the
another; or (b) negligently causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon; or (c) at-
tempts by physical means to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily injury." Id.
"1 There are four torts involving intentional interference with the person. Battery protects
the plaintiff's body from intentional, offensive and unconsented contact. W. PROSSER, supra
note 49, at 34-35. The plaintiff's interest in freedom from the apprehension of a battery is
protected by the tort of assault. Id. at 37-38. The tort of false imprisonment protects the plain-
tiff's interest in freedom from restraints of movement. Id. at 42. Finally, the tort of intentional
infliction of mental distress protects the plaintiff's interest in freedom from mental injuries
such as shock, fright or other extreme reactions which affect the body. Id. at 49-62.
11 L. TRmE, supra note 82, at 895.
90 Modesty means ideas of propriety in dress, speech or conduct determined by conventional
rules of behavior. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DIcTIONARY 733 (1981). Embarrassment is the
self-conscious distress a person experiences when there is a breach of those customs and man-
ners. Id. at 367. A breach of the right of privacy entails the denial of some attribute of what it
means to be human. Such a denial is described as the debasement or degredation of another
person.
" Fried, supra note 60, at 487-88.
"' In one sense, the meaning of privacy can never be totally free of cultural influences. "[W]e
cannot escape from the bias of our own times and places, our own historical situations." Gerety,
supra note 60, at 238.
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concept of privacy.9e The core values have been variously described
as "autonomy . . . over the intimacies of personal identity";e7 "the
right to be self-determining"; e8 respect for "individual dignity,"99
"human dignity," 10 0 or "individuality";10' and the "right of per-
sonhood."'1 2 Moreover, because control over one's body is a funda-
mental prerequisite to all forms of autonomy, privacy also refers to
control over this basic manifestation of selfhood. 103
From these various expressions of the core values protected by the
right of privacy, a unifying principle emerges. The right of privacy in
all of its facets seeks to preserve the condition of being human rather
than being merely conscious or sentient.10 4 Unfortunately, this for-
mulation of privacy's unifying principle operates at an abstract
level, 10 5 unconducive to practically evaluating an employer's claim
that hiring an opposite-sex employee jeopardizes customers' privacy
rights. Nevertheless, it does help to focus the analysis when such a
privacy claim is asserted. The inquiry courts should undertake is
whether the employer's claim for protection of the customer's right of
privacy truly involves the potential violation of the conditions neces-
sary for the preservation of the customer's selfhood. Such an ap-
proach "encourage[s] wise reflection . . . of any action . . . that ap-
pears to transgress what it means to be a human at a given time and
" Fried, supra note 60, at 488. Fried opines that a "true" invasion of privacy occurs only
when the designation of a place or activity as private implicates the core value of the right of
privacy. Id.
" Gerety, supra note 60, at 236. The author also states: "Without such control, much that we
take as distinctively human-love, reflection, choice-cannot flourish or perhaps even survive
in our society." Id. at 266.
" Bloustein, Warren and Brandeis' Tort, supra note 60, at 620. Accord A. WESTIN, supra
note 61, at 7; Singer, supra note 60, at 693.
Kalven, supra note 60, at 326.
100 Singer, supra note 60, at 695.
101 Bloustein, An Answer to Dean Prosser, supra note 60, at 1002-03. Because the concept of
individuality is a peculiarly Western idea, perhaps the concept is the Western manifestation of
the universal right of respect for human dignity.
102 Craven, supra note 60, at 706. The essence of personhood is a rebuttable presumption
that all persons have a right to live their lives free of government regulation. Thus, personhood
includes all those matters not considered to be fundamental rights such as having hair of a
certain length and riding a motorcycle without a helmet. Id. at 710.
101 Gerety, supra note 60, at 266 and n.119.
I Bloustein, supra note 60, at 1003.
105 Furthermore, the numerous definitions of privacy indicate an uncertainty regarding
whether privacy is "a psychological state, a form of power, a right or claim . . . [or) a freedom
not to participate," Parker, supra note 60, at 276; a "condition," Lusky, supra note 60, at 709;
an "immunity," Benn, supra note 60, at 2; a "boundary," Shils, supra note 60, at 282; "breath-
ing space," Kanvitz, supra note 60, at 277; a "rallying point," Symposium on Privacy, 31 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROBs. 253 (1966); a "zone," Henkin, supra note 60, at 1425; or, a "rebuttable
presumption," Craven, supra note 60, at 706.
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place. ' o"
Finally, an analysis of an employer's privacy-based sex BFOQ de-
fense must take into account the waivable nature of the right of pri-
vacy. Participation in society necessarily entails some relinquishment
of one's right of privacy. Moreover, the power to voluntarily relin-
quish some aspect of one's privacy rights is implicit in the very na-
ture of the right. Indeed, if "renunciation [of privacy] from the inside
is practically impossible" then privacy is a meaningless concept.107
Privacy is an equally meaningless concept when no practical possibil-
ity exists for "the abrogation of privacy by intrusion from the
outside."10 8 Thus, any discussion of the nature of the privacy rights
of a person isolated from humanity is illogical. This is true not only
because no one is present to intrude upon the person's solitude, but
also because the person cannot relinquish the solitude with respect to
another because none is present.
Once voluntary relinquishment of some part of the right of privacy
occurs because a social relationship is entered into and certain social
roles are assumed, it is no longer reasonable to expect the same de-
gree of privacy to exist in the relationship as existed prior to the re-
linquishment.10 9 If, for example, a person decides to see a doctor for
the purpose of a physical examination, the doctor-patient relation-
ship necessarily gives rise to an invasion of that patient's bodily in-
tegrity. Therefore, the patient has relinquished the right to object to
the doctor's touching or observation of the patient's body.
Typically, employers raise the privacy-based sex BFOQ defense in
employment situations where customers may be required to disrobe
or where customers may have to perform bodily functions in the
presence of an opposite-sex employee. This context is laden with cul-
turally conditioned and emotionally charged notions of modesty and
embarrassment.110 Moreover, the employer's defense appeals to the
I"0 L. TamE, supra note 82, at 892. Tribe makes clear that there is no need to apologize for
the lack of total precision and concreteness in the various definitional attempts. "[Tlhere is
hubris and fragility and, paradoxically, a bleak conservatism, in designing and defending any
absolute right. Any fundamental rights of personhood and privacy too precisely defined or in-
flexibly defined defy the seasons and are likely to be by-passed by the spring floods." Id.
1o Shils, supra note 60, at 281.
108 Id.
100 Rachels, supra note 61, at 331. Rachels states:
In general, a fact about ourselves is someone's business if there is a specific social rela-
tionship between us which entitles them to know. We are often free to choose whether or
not to enter into such relationships, and those who want to maintain as much privacy as
possible will enter them only reluctantly.
Id.
110 See supra note 93.
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most basic and readily understood component of privacy: bodily in-
tegrity. If the customer has waived his or her right of privacy or if the
presence of an opposite-sex employee does not violate the conditions
necessary for the preservation of the customer's selfhood, however, a
privacy-based sex BFOQ should not be recognized.
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRIVACY-BASED SEX BFOQ
The first inquiry in an analysis of the employer's privacy-based sex
BFOQ defense 1 should be whether the customer, that is, the person
whose privacy rights are asserted, stands in a coercive or noncoercive
environment. A coercive environment embraces those situations
where the customer has no practical or legal choice but to perform an
act, such as disrobing or performing a bodily function, in the pres-
ence of an employee. Prisons and institutions such as hospitals and
nursing homes are clearly coercive. 1" 2 Prisons are coercive because
the presence of the customer (inmate) is legally compelled by judicial
sentence; institutions are coercive because the need to relieve physi-
cal or mental suffering practically compels the customer (patient) to
enter the environment. Noncoercive environments include all em-
ployment situations where the customer has a true choice regarding
his or her presence. Most stores and shops are noncoercive settings
because the customer voluntarily decides whether to enter such an
environment.118
One advantage of the coercive/noncoercive dichotomy is its focus
on the customer, and especially on the customer's choice. Such a per-
spective prevents the rationale supporting the result in one environ-
mental context from being unthinkingly applied in the other. This
advantage is particularly salient where the customer's voluntary
" This proposal and the conclusions drawn herein are applicable in any situation where
there is an alleged conflict between customer privacy rights and employee rights of equal em-
ployment opportunity. Therefore, the proposal and conclusions may be appropriately used in
any Title VII litigation involving employers' attempts to defend facial sex discrimination (re-
fusal to hire, transfer, promote) by raising the privacy issue. However, the analysis does not
seek to compel the use of unisex restroom facilities, sleeping quarters or disrobing areas. It is
aimed only at facilitating the hiring, transferring or promoting of employees into jobs within
these areas without regard to the sex of the employees.
I'l One commentator noted that "[h]ospitals, prisons, military barracks, and live-in schools
of all kinds deprive their inhabitants of privacy. This is part of the policy of those delegated to
run such establishments, because in nonprivacy there is maximum opportunity to control be-
havior, to produce conformity to assigned roles." Jourard, supra note 60, at 313.




waiver of the right of privacy is concerned. While the voluntary
waiver principle is operative in a noncoercive setting, it is ludicrous
to argue that a customer has voluntarily waived his or her privacy
right in a coercive setting.
Included within the customer's right of bodily integrity is the right
not to be subjected to unconsented observations and touchings. 11'
Nevertheless, when a customer decides to purchase a suit which re-
quires a fitting by a clerk, that customer implicitly, if not explicitly,
consents to an invasion of this right to be free from observation and
touching. The invasion is necessary and incidental to the fitting pro-
cess. The fact that the customer prefers to permit such observation
and touching by only a same-sex clerk is not a privacy claim. Rather,
the customer is merely complaining that the presence of an opposite-
sex employee offends his or her notion of modesty predicated on the
expectation that same-sex clerks will be employed. The principle un-
derlying the recognition of the right of privacy - respect for human
dignity - does not require protection of this culturally determined,
and therefore changeable, 5 idea of modesty which is inextricably
tied to stereotypes regarding the conventional roles of women and
men.-
1
Certain forms of observation and touching unquestionably degrade
114 At the moment an individual voluntarily enters a situation where they may be seen by
others, some part of the right to be free from unconsented observations or touchings is relin-
quished. See Bloustein, An Answer to Dean Prosser, supra note 60, at 1004. If this were not
true, all people would be compelled to divert their eyes as they pass one another on streets or in
stores.
"0 Compare the reactions of a Victorian woman and a contemporary woman to the in-
advertant exposure of their knees. The Victorian woman, unlike her contemporary counterpart,
would be embarrassed by this breach of her concept of modesty. See Rachels, supra note 61, at
332.
"' In Roberts v. Union Co., 487 F.2d 387 (6th Cir. 1973), a case involving a BFOQ for male
clerks in a men's department of a clothing store, the employer refused to hire female clerks on
the basis of customer privacy rights. Although the court did not reach the issue, the employer
argued thit because males are clerks in men's departments by tradition, the customer's notions
of modesty might be offended upon discovering an opposite-sex employee in a situation requir-
ing the customer to disrobe and be touched in the fitting process. See also Hodgson v. Robert
Hall Clothes, 473 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub nom. Brennan v. Robert Hall
Clothes, Inc., 414 U.S. 866 (1973); Hodgson v. City Stores Inc., 332 F. Supp. 942 (D. Ala. 1971),
a/I'd, 479 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1973). Although both of these decisions are Equal Pay Act cases
involving other issues, the decisions assume an employer is justified in not hiring females to sell
men's clothes and vice versa.
It is interesting to note that women who purchase designer originals often expect the designer
to be male. It is therefore logical to assume that they also expect that they will be involved in
the selection and fitting process which of course, involves disrobing and touching. There ap-
pears to be no analogous expectations surrounding the sale of men's clothing.
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and deny human dignity.117 The touching and observation involved in
the fitting of a new suit, are not, however, intrinsically degrading
whether performed by a same-sex or opposite-sex clerk. When a cus-
tomer voluntarily permits an observation and touching by a same-sex
clerk and is not denigrated by it, it is spurious to argue that the val-
ues protected by the right of privacy are threatened merely because
the clerk is the opposite-sex of the customer.
When Congress enacted Title VII it intended to alter traditional
employment patterns."1 To accomplish this goal, prevailing social
mores must be altered. 9 Soon after Title VII's enactment, both the
courts and the EEOC rejected a sex BFOQ defense based on claims
of pure customer preference, noting that Title VII was meant to elim-
inate such products of social stereotypes.1 20 Similarly, the privacy-
based sex BFOQ arising in a noncoercive context should be rejected.
If it is not rejected, customers' preferences and social prejudices will
determine not only whether sex discrimination is valid but also
whether employment patterns will change.'
In the noncoercive setting, notions of modesty conflict with the em-
ployee's right to equal employment opportunities. The employee's
right is far more important than any interest the customer may have
in freedom from embarrassment."" As the public becomes accus-
'" Benn, supra note 60, at 8-9. Benn describes one form of such touching and observation as
follows:
The doctor in examining a patient appears insensible to the fact that it is a person he is
examining, a subject to whom it makes a difference that he is observed, who will also
have a view about what is discovered or demonstrated and will put his own value on it.
Id.
" Sirota, supra note 11, at 1065.
119 Id. Contra A. LARSON & L. LARSON, supra note 38, § 14.30, at 4-8. Larson contends that
"[t]he purpose of the sex provision ... is to eliminate sex discrimination in employment, not
to make over the accepted mores and personal sensitivities of the American people in the more
uninhibited image favored by any particular commission, court or commentator." Id. It is diff-
cult, however, to see how the goal of eliminating sex discrimination in employment can be
accomplished without changing "accepted mores and personal sensitivities."
Historically, "accepted mores" based on assumptions regarding the proper role of women
required the exclusion of women from many occupations. "Personal sensitivities" are not the
core value protected by the right of privacy. Moreover, Larson, as well as the courts, recognize
that if customer preference "were accepted. . .as a basis for a BFOQ exception, the extrapola-
tion of that principle to all legally indistinguishable situations would carve an unacceptably
large slice out of the area intended to be protected by sex discrimination legislation." Id. §
15.40, at 4-33. The author draws an indefensible distinction between sex and race discrimina-
tion by arguing for protection of customers' "personal sensibilities" in the former context, but
rejecting such sensibilities as irrelevant in the latter context. Id. § 15.40, at 4-32.
120 Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1971), rev'g 311 F. Supp.
559 (S.D. Fla. 1970); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1)(iii) (1982).
" Cf. EEOC Decision No. 70-11, 1973 EEOC Dec. (CCH) 6025 (1969).
"' The statistics cited supra note 12 illustrate that women have long been denied equal em-
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tomed to finding both female and male employees in all occupations,
ideas of modesty will change concommitantly to accommodate the
presence of opposite-sex employees. 2 ' Furthermore, because the non-
coercive environment is, by definition, one where the customer has a
real choice, those customers who may be unwilling or unable to toler-
ate the presence of opposite-sex employees are free to forego the
experience.
In the coercive setting, the analysis of the privacy-based BFOQ de-
fense must be different than that employed in the noncoercive envi-
ronment. For those incarcerated in prisons, detention centers, and ju-
venile facilities or committed to mental hospitals, confinement is
involuntary. Consequently, inmates do not voluntarily waive any part
of their right of privacy; nor can they choose to avoid the experience.
Similarly, most patients in facilities, such as nursing homes and hos-
pitals, do not enter voluntarily. Although some people may choose to
forego medical treatment for religious or other reasons, most have no
practical alternative but to enter the facility for treatment of their
ailment. Therefore, admission to health facilities cannot constitute a
waiver of privacy rights analogous to that implied when a person
chooses to enter a truly noncoercive environment. Because observa-
tion and touching of a patient's body is an indispensible aspect of
treating illness and injury, medical supervision and treatment inevi-
tably entails some intrusions into the bodily integrity facet of the pa-
tient's right of privacy. Nevertheless, the patient relinquishes only so
much of the protection afforded by the right of privacy as is neces-
sary for the delivery of medical care. The patient's privacy rights re-
quire that medical personnel respect the basic inviolability of the pa-
tient's body during medical care. This respect is manifested in the
personnel's competent and professional performance of their
duties.12
The BFOQ privacy cases arising out of hospital settings do not
contain any allegations, or even intimations, that male nurses or fe-
male doctors cannot render competent and professional care to their
opposite-sex patients. Moreover, the amount and type of observation
and touching necessary for the delivery of medical treatment (the ac-
ployment opportunities. It is this author's opinion that this country's long-standing segregated
employment pattern justifies the contemporary elevation of equal employment opportunities to
a level above concern for individual embarrassment.
"I Sirota, supra note 11, at 1065.
124 Medical personnel are trained to respect the inviolability of the body. See Comment, Sex
Discrimination Justified Under Title VII: Privacy Rights in Nursing Homes, 14 VAL. U.L.
REv. 577, 589 (1979-1980).
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tual intrusion of the patient's bodily integrity) remains the same re-
gardless of the sex of the medical personnel providing the treatment.
The crux of the complaint in these cases is often that some male pa-
tients may experience embarrassment when treated by a female doc-
tor. Yet, those same male patients willingly accept intimate bodily
care from female nurses. Similarly, some female patients may suffer
embarrassment from bodily care provided by male nurses despite
their acceptance of treatment by male gynecologists and ob-
stetricians.
In effect, these patients have an expectation that nurses will be
female and doctors will be male. Surprise and sometimes shock may
occur when a patient discovers females and males performing non-
traditional medical roles. Because 96.5% of all registered nurses are
female and 86.6% of all doctors are male,1 5 the patient's expecta-
tions certainly are not irrational; but preservation of the conditions
necessary for human dignity does not require legal protection of such
expectations. Furthermore, insofar as these expectations are predi-
cated on sex-role stereotypes,12 6 they should not be permitted to im-
pede the Title VII purpose of equality of the sexes for employment
opportunities.
The analysis of the employer's privacy-based sex BFOQ defense
arising out of such coercive environments as prisons, detention cen-
ters, juvenile facilities, and mental hospitals should be similar to the
analysis applied to a hospital setting. Prisoners and other people law-
fully confined against their will by the state do not voluntarily relin-
quish any facet of their right of privacy. In fact, the Supreme Court
has specifically held that convicted offenders as well as pretrial de-
tainees retain certain constitutional rights including the right of pri-
115 WOMEN'S BUREAU, supra note 12, at Table 11.
19 Professor Wasserstrom's observations on the role played by sexually segregated bath-
rooms in our culture are relevant to the thesis that customers' notions of privacy have a lot to
do with sexism rather than "true" privacy.
The case against [sexually segregated bathrooms] now would rest on the ground that
they are, perhaps, one small part of that scheme of sex-role differentiation which uses
the mystery of sexual anatomy, among other things, to maintain the primacy of hetero-
sexual sexual attraction central to that version of the patriarchal system of power rela-
tionships we have today.
The conjecture about the role of sexually segregated bathrooms may well be inaccurate
or incomplete. The sexual segregation of bathrooms may have more to do with privacy
than patriarchy. However, if so, it is at least odd that what the institution makes rele-
vant is sex rather than merely the ability to perform the eliminatory act in private.
Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism and Preferential Treatment: An Approach to the Topics, 24
UCLA L. REV. 581, 593-94 & n.24 (1976-77) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 48
Sex BFOQ
vacy.117 The Supreme Court decisions, however, make it clear that,
although prisoners do not waive their right of privacy, "[t]he fact of
confinement, as well as the legitimate goals and policies of the penal
institution, limits these retained constitutional rights.' 28
The analysis of a sex BFOQ predicated on inmates' privacy should
begin with the determination of whether the act complained of actu-
ally is an infringement of the right of privacy. Regardless of the gen-
der of guards and inmates, all body cavity searches of inmates12 9 as
well as all observations by guards of inmates in the act of showering,
disrobing, or performing bodily functions are invasions of the bodily
integrity facet of the inmates' privacy rights. 30 While consent would
remove all grounds for objections to such invasions, it is lacking in
this context because inmates, by definition, do not voluntarily enter
the coercive environment.
Once the complained of act is deemed an invasion of a facet of the
right of privacy, the next step should be to determine if the invasion
is nonetheless justified."3 ' In the context of involuntary institutional-
ization, the very fact of confinement coupled with the necessity for
institutional security, internal order, and discipline may override
some aspects of the inmates' privacy rights. 32 The scope of the intru-
sion, the manner in which it is conducted, the reason for initiating it,
and the place where it occurs are all relevant factors in balancing the
need for the particular intrusion against the invasion of privacy.'
Obviously, there is room to disagree about the weight assigned to
these factors and the particular balance struck by the court in a par-
ticular case. 3 4 There is no logical reason, however, to include in the
equation the gender of the guards and the inmates.3 5
'" Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union,
Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 129 (1977); Wolf v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974); Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974).
"0 Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1945). See also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545-46
(1979); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 125 (1977); Wolf v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974).
'" A body cavity search may involve either a visual or physical examination of the mouth,
rectum and vagina of an inmate.
"' Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 560 (1979); id. at 576-77 (Marshall, J. dissenting); id. at 594
(Stevens, J. dissenting).
131 A person's privacy rights are not an impenetrable shield against all unconsented to intru-
sions. Bloustein, An Answer to Dean Prosser, supra note 60, at 1004.
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546 (1979).
18 Id. at 559.
:u For an excellent discussion of inmates' privacy rights which provides background for an
understanding of these factors, see Singer, supra note 60. See also Jourard, supra note 60, at
313-14 for a discussion of the psychological aspects of privacy in institutional life.
'" Inmates who have complained about visual body cavity searches objected to the proce-
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For example, although strip searches accompanied by body cavity
searches are gross intrusions into the inmates' right of bodily integ-
rity, the Supreme Court has upheld the Bureau of Prisons' policy re-
quiring inmates to expose their body cavities for visual inspection as
part of a strip search conducted after every contact with an outside
person.136 Assuming that the Supreme Court struck the correct bal-
ance between legitimate correctional needs and inmates' privacy
rights, of what relevance is the guard's gender? The actual degree of
physical invasion into the inmate's body does not increase or de-
crease because of the gender of the guard. Although opposite-sex
guards may abuse opposite-sex inmates under the guise of perform-
ing an otherwise constitutionally permissible body cavity search,
same-sex guards may conduct searches of same-sex inmates in an
equally abusive fashion. Moreover, abusive conduct by either female
or male guards, regardless of the inmate's gender, is not condoned by
any Supreme Court decision permitting limitations on an inmate's
privacy rights.5 7 The remedy, however, for an unjustifiable violation
of an inmate's bodily integrity by a guard is punishment of the guard,
and not the wholesale exclusion of all opposite-sex guards from the
institution. 8
Institutions have the duty to employ guards who will not engage in
abusive treatment of inmates. It is impossible to establish, however,
that a nonabusive body search cannot be performed by a guard on an
opposite-sex inmate. 3 9 Without such a showing, denial of employ-
dure without reference to the sex of the guards. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). Cf.
York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 939 (1964). In York a male
police officer took pictures of the nude plaintiff in various indecent positions after telling her
that such a procedure was necessary in order to file her complaint. The pictures were not made
for any legitimate purpose. The officer circulated the prints within the department. It is hard to
imagine that the act would have been a less outrageous violation of the plaintiff's right of pri-
vacy if the police officer had been a female.
"' Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558-60 (1979). The decision is applicable to pretrial detain-
ees as well as convicted inmates. Id. at 546.
"I Id. at 560.
18 Justice Marshall made an analogous point in the Alabama prison guard case wherein the
majority permitted the state to exclude female guards because of the potential of inmate as-
saults. "The proper response to inevitable attacks on both female and male guards is not to
limit the employment opportunities of law-abiding women. . . but to take swift and sure puni-
tive action against the inmate offenders." Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 346 (1977) (Mar-
shall, J. dissenting).
o' Moreover, as suggested by Justice Marshall:
if women [or men] guards behave in a professional manner at all times, they will engen-
der reciprocal respect from inmates, who will recognize that their privacy is being in-
vaded no more than if a woman [or man] doctor examines them. The suggestion implicit
in the privacy argument that such behavior is unlikely on either side is an insult to the
professionalism of guards and the dignity of inmates.
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ment opportunities on the basis of a guard's gender is based on im-
permissible assumptions and stereotypical characterizations of the
sexes and their relationship to each other."40
In the context of a coercive institutional environment, respect for
human dignity, the unifying principle of the various facets of the
right of privacy, does require justification of all invasions of the in-
mates' privacy rights by weightier counterveiling correctional consid-
erations. Respect for human dignity, however, does not require free-
dom from justifiable invasions by opposite-sex actors. Moreover, the
equal employment mandates of Title VII support the exclusion of sex
as a factor in balancing institutional needs and inmates' privacy
rights.1 41 While inquiries regarding whether a particular institutional
practice is an invasion of the inmate's right of privacy and whether
the invasion is justified by weightier counterveiling correctional con-
siderations are proper in a privacy analysis, questions of gender are
not. The privacy rights of inmates are no more at risk if opposite-sex
guards are employed than if same-sex guards perform the complained
of act."42
V. CONCLUSION
The guarantee of equal employment opportunity in Title VII must
be zealously guarded. Although the statutorily created BFOQ defense
is an exception to Title VII's general mandate forbidding employ-
ment discrimination on the basis of sex, the typically narrow inter-
pretation of the BFOQ provision in both EEOC guidelines and court
decisions imposes significant limitations on the extent of this excep-
tion. The courts' acceptance of a privacy-based sex BFOQ defense
represents a threat to Title VII's dual goals of equal employment op-
portunity and nondiscrimination. Thus, the privacy-based BFOQ
must be closely scrutinized.
In order to properly evaluate the privacy-based sex BFOQ, the
Id. at 346 n.5.
140 There is reason to believe that the presence of female guards in male prisons may actually
further the rehabilitative process by creating an environment more closely analogous to the real
world which includes females as well as males. Id. at 346.
"I See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
141 A comment made by the Associate Warden at San Quentin supports the idea that male
inmates' objections to female guards have more to do with sexism than privacy. "The problem
is that it can ruin the tough image of the convict. How can you do the Bogart thing when you
have a woman guarding you." San Francisco Chron., March 28, 1973, at 2, col. 8, cited in H.
KAY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION 574 (2d ed. 1981).
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public versus private employment analytic framework should be re-
jected. Such rejection is necessary because the approach is premised
upon the erroneous idea that privacy rights are more extensive in the
public sector than in private sector employment. Also, the public-pri-
vate dichotomy fails to address the central question: whether any
facet of the right of privacy is in issue.
The unifying principle of the multifaceted right of privacy is pres-
ervation of human dignity. When a privacy-based claim is asserted, it
must be evaluated in terms of whether the alleged invasion violates
the conditions necessary for the preservation of selfhood. The claim
must not be confused with culturally conditioned notions of modesty
and embarrassment or with stereotyped characterizations of the
sexes. Because privacy rights can be waived when a true invasion of
the right of privacy is in issue, the analysis of the claim must take
into account whether the person whose rights are asserted stands in a
coercive or noncoercive environment. In a coercive environment, con-
sent is always lacking, therefore, once an act is deemed an invasion of
the right of privacy, the only remaining issue is whether the infringe-
ment is justified by weightier counterveiling considerations.
This proposed framework for evaluating the privacy-based BFOQ
defense to Title VII violations may appear immodest to some read-
ers. Absent such an approach, notions of modesty, as opposed to true
privacy rights, will outweigh and triumph over congressional policy
and the arduous and continuing struggle for the eradication of em-
ployment discrimination on the basis of sex.
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